The blurred boundaries of functional reference: a response to Scarantino & Clay  by Wheeler, Brandon C. & Fischer, Julia
lable at ScienceDirect
Animal Behaviour 100 (2015) e9ee13Contents lists avaiAnimal Behaviour
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/anbehavForumThe blurred boundaries of functional reference: a response to
Scarantino & Clay
Brandon C. Wheeler a, b, *, Julia Fischer a
a Cognitive Ethology Laboratory, German Primate Center, G€ottingen, Germany
b School of Anthropology & Conservation, University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K.a r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 2 November 2014
Initial acceptance 6 November 2014
Final acceptance 6 November 2014
Available online 6 December 2014
MS. number: AF-14-00879
Keywords:
affect
animal communication
cognition
decision making
functional reference
information
language evolution
meaningThe past years have shown a resurgence of interest in concep-
tual issues in animal communication, with much of the debate
centering on the concept of information (e.g. Carazo & Font, 2010;
Rendall, Owren,& Ryan, 2009; Ruxton& Schaefer, 2011; Scarantino,
2010; Scott-Phillips, 2008; Seyfarth et al., 2010), and whether the
identiﬁcation of so-called ‘functional reference’ contributes to a
better understanding of linguistic reference, and ultimately the
evolution of speech (Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011; Manser, 2013;
Townsend & Manser, 2013; Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). Scarantino
and Clay's (2015; hereafter S&C) Forum article in this issue con-
tinues this debate, and is largely a response to a recent paper of ours
(Wheeler& Fischer, 2012). In our original paper, we contended that
all cases of animal communication in which receiver responses
could be explained in terms of the information provided by the
signal could be said to function referentially. According to most
deﬁnitions, this applies to the entire spectrum of animal commu-
nication (see Rendall et al., 2009). Because the boundaries of
‘functional reference’ have been blurred to a degree where it is no* Correspondence: B. C. Wheeler, School of Anthropology & Conservation, Uni-
versity of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NR, U.K.
E-mail address: bcwheeler43@gmail.com (B. C. Wheeler).
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ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).longer productive to distinguish between functionally referential
communication and communication more generally, we suggested
to abandon the term altogether. In addition, we argued that the
original motivation to study ‘referential’, ‘semantic’ or ‘symbolic’
communication in animals was to search for the substrate that gave
rise to referential communication in human speech. Once it became
clear that functionally referentially calls most likely do not share
central criteria for linguistic reference, and therefore do little to
illuminate the origins of linguistic reference, the concept lost much
of its allure, at least to us. We further suggested an alternative
framework that aims to elucidate the potential cognitive mecha-
nisms underpinning receiver behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we suggested
to distinguish between ‘meaning attribution’ and ‘decisionmaking’,
and to consider the role of additional sources of information, such
as contextual variation on both.
In their article, S&C take another route, and argue that it would
be more productive to retain the term ‘functional reference’ but
redeﬁne what would constitute such a signal. Moreover, they crit-
icize our notion of meaning attribution in animals. We ﬁndmuch to
both agree and disagree with in S&C's proposal. Considering their
paper as a whole, most of the disagreement between their
perspective and our own seems to be a rather simple difference in
preferred terminology rather than a fundamental differencenimal Behaviour by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
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stantial part of their paper is an attempt to formalize the roles of
information and context and their relevance for signal receivers,
and we ﬁnd these contributions to be both insightful and largely
consistent with the alternative framework we propose. At the same
time, we disagree with S&C on a number of points and believe that
it ultimately underscores the strengths of our proposed framework
for conceptualizing the cognitive mechanisms involved in signal
perception.
SENDERS VERSUS RECEIVERS AND THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
The concept of functional reference was introduced to
acknowledge that some signals appeared to function in the same
way as human words while the proximate mechanisms that
underpinned the production of such signals essentially remained
unclear (Marler, Evans, & Hauser, 1992). Yet, despite professed
neutrality regarding the cognitive mechanisms underpinning
functionally referential communication, a distinction was made
from the beginning between referential and emotional aspects of
animal signalling; that is, at the level of the mechanisms (Marler
et al., 1992). Although, initially, emotional and symbolic aspects of
animal communication were pitted against each other (Marler,
1984), it was later conceded that these two aspects were not
mutually exclusive, insofar as a given signal could simultaneously
have both referential and emotional components, just as a human
speaker's current emotional state will have some effect on the
structure of a given linguistic utterance, but emotion and reference
were nevertheless considered distinct aspects at the mechanistic
level (Marler et al., 1992). A purely emotional signal would thus not
qualify as referential, indicating that the mechanistic-agnosticism
of functional reference had its limits.
It was more than a decade later that Seyfarth and Cheney (2003)
pointed out that the mechanisms underpinning signal production
in most animals are unrelated to the mechanisms that are involved
in the perception of those same signals. The distinction between
emotion and reference was, they claimed, like comparing apples
and oranges, not because a given signal could potentially have both
emotional and referential components as Marler et al. (1992)
correctly pointed out, but because emotion is best seen as related
to signal production, while the referential aspects applied to the
receiver. That is, a signal could be purely emotional in its produc-
tion, but, if the signal's production shares a predictable relationship
with the occurrence of something salient to receivers, then the
potential exists for receivers to take the signal as being indicative of
that salient phenomenon. Wheeler and Fischer's (2012) argument
was largely based on this insight: the production of most signals,
even in species with relatively well-developed cognitive abilities,
appears indeed to be based on very different mechanisms than
those involved in the production of language, but there may be
some degree of cognitive continuity in the mechanisms involved in
the comprehension of calls and language on the side of the re-
ceivers (but see Scott-Phillips, in press). At least in some cases,
recipients learn through experience that a given signal is associated
with a given phenomenon, and this learning explains their re-
sponses to one degree or another (but see Owren & Rendall, 2001;
Rendall et al., 2009 for extended discussions of factors affecting
lower-level responses).
Although S&C do not make an explicit distinction between
senders and receivers, they do so implicitly by setting no limits on
what mechanisms should underpin the production of functionally
referential signals, while limiting such designation to cases in
which receivers ‘take the call to stand for’ something (and thus
excluding cases in which behavioural responses are driven solely
by, for example, neuroendocrine processes). S&C thus seem trulyagnostic regarding the mechanisms underlying signal production,
leading them to advocate for the extension of the realm of possible
‘referents’ to include phenomena that are considered ‘internal’ to
the signaller. Such a conception of ‘referent’ is in line with that
suggested by Smith (1981); it contrasts, though, with that of the
originators of the concept of functional reference (Macedonia &
Evans, 1993; Marler et al., 1992), and it is this change that argu-
ably does more to move functional reference away from its original
conception than do the proposed changes to the production and
perception criteria that S&C largely focus on.
The suggestions to remove the distinction between internal and
external ‘referents’ and to eliminate the focus on context speciﬁcity
in both signal production and signal perception are fully in
concordance with our own suggestions (Wheeler & Fischer, 2012).
Indeed, despite some disagreements about the weight given to
different lines of evidence, it seems that when S&C would conclude
that ‘signal x functionally refers to y’, we would likewise tend to
conclude that ‘the receiver has attributed the meaning y to the
signal’, and vice versa. That the difference is largely terminological
is evinced by the fact that S&C equate their conception of functional
reference with receivers taking a signal x to ‘stand for’ a phenom-
enon y; it is hard to see this as much more than a slightly different
way of saying that the receiver attributes the meaning y to the
signal. The differences between our perspectives regarding what
evidence might be necessary for one to draw the conclusion that x
means (or ‘refers to’, or ‘stands for’) y for a given receiver may be a
point of genuine disagreement, but this is a separate issue from
which set of terminology (or even which conceptual framework)
one prefers; one could easily adopt their criteria and our termi-
nology or vice versa, and one should not conﬂate these realms as
S&C appear to do.
Our rejection of the term ‘functional reference’ and embrace-
ment of ‘meaning attribution’ stems from an explicit consideration
of the distinction between signallers and receivers. While referring
to something (in the original sense) is a behaviour performed by
the sender, attributing meaning to a signal is something done by a
receiver. What we know about the proximatemechanisms involved
in most forms of animal communication (including but not limited
to vocal communication in most mammals) preclude the signals
from being referential in theway that words in human language are
(Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). At the same time, the behavioural re-
sponses of receivers are shaped by experience in a way that sug-
gests that receivers are indeed attributing what can legitimately be
called ‘meaning’ to signals. We suggested that this is possible not
because the signals carry symbolic meaning, but because they carry
a type of ‘natural meaning’ (sensu Grice, 1957), which is instanti-
ated when natural spatiotemporal associations between two phe-
nomena lead to the occurrence of one entailing the occurrence of
the other; this is not unlike the production of a signal correlating
with the occurrence of another event (Scarantino, 2010; Scott-
Phillips, in press; Wharton, 2003). In contrast, the idea that sig-
nallers are referring to things appears to be, at best, an analogy. In
other words, because animal signals have natural meaning, we are
perhaps able to empirically address the question ‘what does that
signal mean to a monkey?’ In contrast, when animal signals lack
symbolic meaning, the questions ‘what did that monkey mean by
producing that signal?’ or ‘what was that monkey referring to?’ are
ill-posed (see Grice, 1957).
S&C are correct that our application of the term ‘natural
meaning’ to animal signals in many cases falls outside the bound-
aries of Grice's (1957) concept (S&C's criticism that we can do
playbacks of snake alarms in the absence of snakes is not a good
argument, though, as experimental manipulations could be applied
to any of Grice's actual examples to argue that natural meaning
does not exist at all; but we concede that the fact that naturally
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criticism). The problem stems from the fact that Grice's dichotomy
of natural and non-natural meaning is not exhaustive, even as
applied as intended to human communication, but applying the
concept to encompass animal signalling requires only relatively
minor modiﬁcations to Grice's conception of natural meaning
(Wharton, 2003). Importantly, the difference between strict Gri-
cean natural meaning and the correlational meaning of animal
signals is one of degree, whereas the difference between this type
of meaning and the non-natural (symbolic) meaning that is based
on social conventions and characterises language is one of kind
(Deacon, 1997; Fitch, 2010; Scott-Phillips, in press; Wharton, 2003;
Wheeler & Fischer, 2012).
Strictly speaking, most animal signals probably do have Gricean
natural meaning, with that meaning being the internal state or
states associatedwith the production of the signal. But themeaning
that a receiver attributes to a given signal (or, in other words, what
the receiver takes the signal to indicate about its world) is in only
rare cases going to be this internal state of the receiver. Rather, we
contend that, at least in species without the ability to understand
that others have internal states, the receiver's attributed meaning
must be some phenomenon it is capable of directly observing and
that is to some extent reliably associated with the signal's pro-
duction. This phenomenon can be something completely external
to the signaller, such as a predator, food or conspeciﬁc competitor,
or what is typically considered more internal to the signaller, such
as its subsequent behaviour or ﬁghting ability. In other cases, re-
ceivers respond adaptively to a signal even when its relevant
correlate (e.g. probability of conception) is unlikely to be observable
(e.g. male baboons varying their mating effort based on the size of
the swelling of a female's anogenital region; Zinner, Nunn, van
Schaik, & Kappeler, 2004); in these cases, it would not seem to
make sense to interpret the responses in terms of meaning attri-
bution, but instead as an innate response to the signal.
Thus the strict Gricean natural meaning of a signal will in most
cases differ from the meaning that a receiver attributes to the
signal, although the two are clearly related concepts because they
are both based on the natural spatiotemporal associations that exist
between the signal and its meaning. Furthermore, there is prece-
dent and growing momentum to explicitly apply Grice's concepts,
and at least the ‘natural’ portion of his terminology, to describe the
nature of meaning in animal signals (‘natural information’:
Scarantino, 2010; ‘natural code’: Wharton, 2003; Scott-Phillips, in
press).
In summary, many animals appear to make learned associations
between receiving a given signal and the occurrence of some other
relevant phenomenon. Once that learned association is in place,
then receivers are in a position to make predictions regarding what
is likely to occur following the perception of the signal. In such
cases it seems fair to say that the receiver takes the signal to mean y
(or, perhaps to speak less ambiguously, that it indicates y). The fact
that receivers respond adaptively as if responding to that phe-
nomenon itself may be necessary but it is certainly not sufﬁcient to
conclude that the responses are driven proximately by meaning
attribution, as this is only one possible mechanism that may un-
derlie such adaptive responses. Diagnosing meaning attribution
thus requires one to take a broad perspective to infer, if not directly
investigate, the proximate mechanisms that underlie receiver
responses.
PROBLEMS WITH THE CRITERIA FOR DIAGNOSING ‘NEW’
FUNCTIONAL REFERENCE
Much of S&C's argument that sticking with functional reference
is a better way forward rests on their contention that they haveprovided unambiguous diagnostic criteria for future authors to rely
on. S&C's keymove is to combine a signal and its context to create a
‘unit of functional reference’ (p. e4). Following Scarantino (2013),
functional reference is now operationalized the following way: ‘a
signal of type X in context C functionally refers to, or meansR, a state
of affairs of type Y if (1) Xs in context C correlate with Ys […] (in-
formation criterion), and (2) presentations of Xs in context C and in
the absence of Ys reliably elicit contextually adaptive responses in
receivers speciﬁc to Ys (response criterion).’ The fundamental
problem here is that all signals will now meet the modiﬁed pro-
duction criterion, because all that is required is that a researcher
breaks context down into sufﬁciently small categories that, within
each category, the signal has some association with some given
phenomenon. As a consequence, it would also be impossible to
distinguish between truly referential signals (if they existed) and
most other signals.
The only potential cases of animal signalling to not meet S&C's
criteria would therefore be those systems in which receiver re-
sponses are not adaptive to the receiver (e.g. sensory bias exploi-
tation; Ryan, 1990). However, such cases do not fall under most
deﬁnitions of communication or signalling, which either explicitly
limit communication to cases in which receiver responses are
adaptive for the receiver (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003; Scott-
Phillips, 2008), or to cases in which information is conveyed (e.g.
Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011). It thus seems difﬁcult to come up
with an example of a signalling system, falling under these deﬁ-
nitions, in which the perception criteria would not be likely to be
met. While S&C require that the responses be adaptive even in the
absence of the referent, cases in which the supposed referent is not
observable to the receiver (e.g. the referent is internal to the
signaller and is never observable, or is only observable some time
after the signal is produced, as in the case of the signaller's sub-
sequent behaviour) provide a sort of natural experiment which
suggests that such adaptive responses occur widely in the absence
of an observable referent.
S&C go on to argue that they would not in fact consider all
signals to be functionally referential, but in order to do so they are
forced to go beyond their supposedly ‘diagnostic’ criteria. For
example, even if both criteria are met, S&C do not consider all
adaptive responses as sufﬁcient; orienting responses, even if
perfectly adaptive, do not make the cut because they are not suf-
ﬁciently speciﬁc (while S&C single out orienting responses, it
should be pointed out that even highly speciﬁc antipredator re-
sponses, such as running into the trees in response to a leopard
alarm, could be potentially adaptive to some other ‘referent’). In
other cases, a receiver's response might indeed be highly speciﬁc to
the signal's ‘referent’, but if it is known that the proximate mech-
anisms are something other than the sorts of cognitive processes
necessary for taking a signal to stand for something, then S&C
would not deem it functionally referential. For example, the calls of
male túngara frogs could be said, from a female receiver's
perspective, to function to refer to the presence of a potential mate:
their production is strongly correlated with the presence of a po-
tential mate, and their initiation of proceptive behaviours upon
receiving the signal suggests that their response is adaptive to the
functional referent ‘mating partner’ (see Grafe, 1997). If these re-
sponses are, however, driven purely by neuroendocrine responses
as has been suggested (Wilczynski & Chu, 2001), then it would
seem unsound to make an argument that such signals are linguistic
precursors based on the fact that they function in a similar way as
certain human words or phrases (see also Scott-Phillips, in press).
We thus entirely agree with S&C that researchers should take
these kinds of factors into account in drawing conclusions about
the extent to which receivers are taking the signal to stand for
something (or are attributing meaning). But by allowing for these
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their production and perception criteria are necessary but not
sufﬁcient for diagnosing their conception of functional reference.
This results from the fact that they have deﬁned functional refer-
ence in proximate terms (receivers take the signal to stand for
something) but provided functional criteria for diagnosing it.
Satisfaction of these criteria alone does not tell us what the prox-
imate mechanisms are.
For those speciﬁcally interested in the cognitive mechanisms
underpinning receiver responses, it may be important to consider a
role of information in communication playing out at two distinct
levels. First, information's role may play out over evolutionary time,
wherein particular innate responses to particular signals have been
selected because those signals reliably correlate with something
relevant to receivers. In these cases, receivers can be said to
respond to the signal because the signal has some informative
value, but wewould not say that receivers are ‘attributing meaning’
to the signal. Second, information can be important at the indi-
vidual level wherein an individual takes a signal to be informative
because, due to prior experience, it has learned that the signal
reliably correlates with something in the world. It seems that S&C
would agree with the importance of this distinction, but estab-
lishing the diagnostic criteria for distinguishing between these
cases will not be simple.
DISTINGUISHING MEANING ATTRIBUTION FROM DECISION
MAKING IS NOT A RECIPE FOR OVERINTERPRETATION
In two previous papers (Fischer, 2013;Wheeler& Fischer, 2012),
we used the example of male baboons responding to or ignoring
screams from females (Palombit, Seyfarth, & Cheney, 1997) to
illustrate how such variation in responses can be explained as
variation either in attributed meaning or in deciding how to best
respond to a signal with a given attributed meaning. We argued
that different males might make different decisions in how to
respond to the screams, ignoring them in cases when a response
would not be individually advantageous.
S&C make the correct point that in this case ‘[t]wo options are
possible for the unresponsive males; either they also take the signal
to stand for infanticide, but do not act upon it, or they do not take
the signal to stand for infanticide’ (p. e4). They go on to suggest that,
despite the former being a potential explanation, such a conclusion
goes beyondwhat the data tell us; by applying their production and
perception criteria, we can only conclude that males that ignore the
screams do not take the screams to stand for anything because the
response does not fulﬁl their perception requirement of functional
reference. In reality, whether or not the perception criterion is met
in this case is somewhat subjective, as inaction is arguably a
response (Levitis, Lidicker, & Freund, 2009; see also Fischer &
Hammerschmidt, 2001), and in this case would be one that is
perfectly adaptive since the costs of coming to the aid of an unre-
lated infant would probably outweigh any beneﬁts for the males.
The subjectivity of the perception criteria notwithstanding, are
S&C correct that the fact that ‘responsive males take the signal to
stand for infanticide is not a reason to lean one way or the other
with respect to unresponsive males’? If we are to take only the
information that some males respond and others do not, we would
clearly not have sufﬁcient evidence that the unresponsivemales are
attributing a similar meaning as the responsive males, and that the
differences in their responses are due to differences at the level of
decision making. But we do have more information available to us.
Of particular importance, the unresponsive males and the respon-
sive males are the same individuals; a male that responds to the
screams of his friend when she has an infant ignores those of
nonfriends with infants. Because these males have the sameinformation available to them in both cases, and thus the same
potential to attribute meaning, we believe the best interpretation is
that males are varying their decision making and not their attrib-
uted meaning. But, again, one must take into account a wider range
of information than only whether or not the production and
perception criteria are met. Indeed, the best interpretation of the
baboon example will make use of not only the full range of data
available from that particular study's test and control conditions,
but also other studies with baboons, and even studies of other
closely related taxa. Relying only on S&C's modiﬁed production and
perception criteria simply does not open enough doors for one to
draw a fully informed conclusion.
Even when taking into account this wider range of data, it is
clear that S&C are correct that our preferred interpretation is not
the only possible interpretation. It is less clear why S&C see one
type of error in interpretation (meaning attribution when it is not
occurring) as more ‘risky’ than the other type (that it is not
occurring when it in fact is), and that it is preferable to lean towards
the latter even if the balance of evidence favours the former. We
ﬁnd it especially strange that S&C see this ‘risk’ as so severe that
they suggest to work within a framework that does not even allow
for consideration of this interpretation, even though our suggested
framework allows for both interpretations, including the one that
they prefer. Our framework is fruitful precisely because it sets up
the different interpretations and encourages further studies, if
necessary, to distinguish conclusively between these possibilities
(Wheeler & Hammerschmidt, 2013).MOVING ON
In summary, although we welcome the lively debate that is
likely to move the ﬁeld further, we would maintain that our
framework holds up to the criticism of S&C, and that it continues to
generate productive questions in the realm of animal communi-
cation and cognition. Furthermore, we believe that the revised
deﬁnition presented by S&C does little to rescue the concept of
functional reference. Instead, it lays bare some of the fundamental
weaknesses that have been identiﬁed over the years. We therefore
believe that maintaining the concept would come at the cost of
luring scholars to believe that they are contributing to the under-
standing of the evolution of language, when they are not, and
distracting researchers from more interesting question regarding
the ecology and evolution of signalling behaviour at a more general
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